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WHITHER THE DOHA ROUND?
Michael L. Jensen*
Recently at a conference on U.S.-China bilateral relations in
Beijing, United States Trade Representative Rob Portman
acknowledged that the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round or
DDA) of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations “face[s]
very serious challenges.” Then he made a pitch. In order to “avoid
losing the opportunity presented by Doha,” which is “a once in a
generation opportunity to reduce tariffs and reduce trade distorting
subsidies around the world,” Mr. Portman stated that ‘[w]e need the
help of WTO member countries . . . to make a push for significant
progress in the weeks and months ahead.”1 His pitch is as needed as
his assessment is obvious: on the eve of the Sixth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong in December, the Doha Round is in
trouble, and only concerted effort by member countries and
significant concessions by the holdouts can rescue the stalled global
trade talks.
BACKGROUND
The Doha Round began in 2001 as an ambitious effort to
improve market access and reform in agriculture, services, and
manufactured goods. The reasoning behind this approach seemed
clear: freer trade produces a win-win situation for developed and
developing nations alike. As just one supporting fact, the World
Bank reported that during the 1990s, per capita real income grew an
average of five percent annually in developing countries that
fostered freer trade, nearly three times faster than the average
annual increase of 1.4 percent for countries that did not.2 Further,
“World Bank research found that growth in developing countries
benefits the poor: average incomes of the poorest fifth of society
rise proportionately with average incomes. Factors such as rule of

1
Ambassador Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Rep., Remarks at a Conference Hosted
by China-U.S. Relations: Trade, Diplomacy and Research, in Beijing, China (Nov.
14, 2005) [hereinafter Portman Remarks], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets
/Document_Library/Transcripts/2005/November/asset_upload_file519_8356.pdf.
2
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA POLICY BRIEF,
Facts on the Doha Round (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets
/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2005/asset_upload_file93_8213.pdf.
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law, openness to international trade, and developed financial
markets benefit the poorest fifth of society as much as everyone
else.”3 Developing countries make up approximately two-thirds of
the WTO’s membership; a successful trade round could therefore
have a profoundly positive impact on the global economy. But, as
the World Bank noted recently, “the liberalization targets under the
DDA have to be ambitious if the round is to have a measurable
impact on world markets, and hence poverty . . . .”4
THE KEY ISSUE: AGRICULTURE REFORM
A key issue of the Doha Round has been agriculture reform.
Although this issue was touched on in the previous round (Uruguay
Round) of negotiations, the Doha Round highlighted it as a focus
primarily because so many developing countries have a
comparative advantage in agriculture and insisted on this issue’s
inclusion. According to Mr. Portman’s assessment, “[t]wo of the
three pillars of agriculture reform—eliminating export subsidies
and reducing domestic support—are pretty well along,” and are “in
good shape for negotiation.” But the “final pillar”—market
access—is “not as far along.”5 That is an understatement. After four
years of negotiations, despite a significant U.S. proposal in October
meant to reduce tariffs using the “tiered formula” in the July 2004
Framework, negotiations have made precious little progress
regarding agricultural market access and reform, let alone the other
important areas of the ambitious Doha Round agenda.
Most countries have leveled the blame for the political and
bureaucratic foot dragging in the agricultural sector at the European
Union (EU), especially France, for clinging to long-standing and,
some assert, addictive farm subsidies. But the situation is not so
simple. As noted recently in the Wall Street Journal, “[a]t the core
of the stalled talks is a spaghetti bowl of conflicting demands.”6 A
group of nations (Group of 10) that are net importers of agricultural
goods, including Switzerland and Japan, have offered only modest
reductions in their farm sector tariffs, which would leave them in

3

Id.
Id. at 2.
5
Portman Remarks, supra note 1.
6
Scott Miller, Clock Is Ticking on Trade Talks: Doha Round of Negotiations
Gets Bogged Down in Farm Tariffs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at A14.
4
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some cases higher than the EU.7 Perhaps predictably, some
members of the Group of 10 have demanded hostage-style, deep
cuts in tariffs in the manufacturing sector before entertaining
further reductions in the farm sector.
Other countries are following suit in their own way, pursing,
naturally, their own interests. Brazil, for example, as a member of
the so-called “Group of 20” made up of richer developing
countries, demands that the EU substantially improve its offer to
reduce farm sector tariffs, but it adamantly refuses to consider
reductions of its own high tariffs on the manufacturing sector. As
another example, India, a fellow Group of 20 member, stands
firmly behind its own high farm sector tariffs, but it unsurprisingly
argues that other countries should make more progress in opening
up the services sector.8 And so it goes, country by country, and the
result is a largely fractured approach in the Doha Round. While the
lack of consensus is perhaps most obvious in the agricultural sector,
there are still huge gaps in how to approach the services and
manufacturing sectors as well.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Early in November, trade representatives from five
powerhouses (the U.S., the EU, Japan, Brazil, and India) met in
London and tried—unsuccessfully—to breathe new life into the
negotiations. Immediately thereafter, representatives of a larger
subgroup of countries met in Geneva with the same objective and
the same unfortunate result. As Pascal Lamy, Director-General of
the WTO, pointedly observed to the delegates in Geneva:
Some have said they are not in a position, at this
stage, to move further on Agricultural market
access, unless there is more on the table on NAMA
[Non-Agricultural Market Access], Services, or GIs
[Geographical Indications]. Others have said they
are only able to keep their offer on reduction of
Domestic Subsidies if there is an improved offer on
market access in agriculture on the table. Yet others
say they can only agree to . . . a proposal of cuts of
its industrial tariffs (NAMA) . . . if there is an
7
8

Id.
Id.
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improvement in, and to the extent of, a new offer on
Agricultural market access. And we also hear from
other sides that they will only discuss NAMA if
there is a sufficient degree of precision on Special
Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism.
All of this adds up to some very wide gulfs . . . .9
Mr. Lamy attempted to put the best face on the state of the
Doha Round by observing that “what is already [on the negotiating
table] is not negligible,” and that “nobody wants to reduce the level
of ambition for the Round.”10 But in a burst of candor, Mr. Lamy
observed that “the question is whether—to use the words of the
Indian Minister Kamal Nath—we ‘recalibrate’ the expectations for
Hong Kong—to what can reasonably be achieved or whether we are
ready to run the risk of making Hong Kong an ‘announced
failure’.”11 The answer seemed clear in the malaise among the
delegates and their unwillingness to offer further compromises of
significance: prepare for the Hong Kong meeting with “recalibrated
ambitions.”12
In the wake of these disappointing developments, leaders of
twenty-one Pacific Rim countries met at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum in Busan, Korea on November 18–19,
2005. High on the list of agenda items was the Doha Round. The
government leaders issued a statement supporting the ambitious
(read: not “recalibrated”) objectives of the Round heading into the
Hong Kong meeting. While an unnamed South Korean government
official lamented that the statement would likely fall on deaf ears,
another observer of the forum observed more hopefully that “APEC
includes seven of the world’s 13 largest economies, represents
more than a third of the world’ population, and constitutes 60
percent of the global economy and nearly half world trade, putting

9
Press Release, World Trade Organization, Lamy Says Differences Require
“Recalibration” of Hong Kong Expectations, Calls for “Negotiating Spirit” to
Advance Trade Talks (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news05_e/stat_lamy_nov05_e.htm.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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it in a position where it cannot be ignored.”13 President George W.
Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao, in a joint press conference
in Beijing on November 20, also stressed the importance of
“building consensus on market access issues” at the Hong Kong
meeting in order to permit a new global trade agreement in 2006.14
Whether such last minute endorsements will affect the
substance of the Hong Kong meeting is doubtful. The real question
is whether, among the widely disparate interests of the 148
members of the WTO, enough members can muster the courage to
seize, in Mr. Portman’s words noted above, this “once in a
generation opportunity to reduce tariffs and reduce trade distorting
subsidies around the world.”

13

Op-Ed, APEC Has a Tough Job Ahead in Freeing up World Trade,
SHANGHAIDAILY.COM, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/cat/5/4/
Opinion.htm.
14
Hu, Peggy B., Bush, Chinese President Discuss Trade Issues at Beijing
Meeting, USINFO.STATE.GOV, Nov. 20, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive
/2005/Nov/20-731445.html.
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